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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 21027 
v. : 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, : Priority 1 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. It was not plain error for the trial court not to 
have given the jury a limiting instruction on the use of 
defendant's statements that were repeated by Officer Jorgensen on 
rebuttal to defendant's denial that he made the statements. It 
was not at all clear to the trial court that the evidence came in 
other than substantively and, thus, the court could not have been 
expected to recognize the issue. This is especially true where 
defendant did not object to the evidence as violating his Fifth 
or Sixth Amendment rights. Even if there was plain error, it was 
not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of 
defendant's guilt and rehearing should be denied. 
II. Even if the manslaughter instruction was 
incorrect, defendant was not entitled to the instruction under 
his theory of the case and the error was harmless. Defendant's 
alleged extreme emotional disturbance was the product of his own 
criminal activity, and he was ineligible for the manslaughter 
mitigation that he asserted. Any error was also harmless because 
defendant was found guilty of the greater offense and cannot 
complain that the instruction on the lesser offense was wrong. 
III. The trial court's instructions did not preclude 
the jury from considering the manslaughter defense, but even if 
they did, there was no prejudice to defendant. Even if the jury 
had considered the manslaughter option, it would necessarily have 
rejected it because the crimes were the direct product of 
defendant's own criminal activity. 
IV. This Court need not rule on defendant's claim that 
introduction of the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance 
at the guilt phase is unconstitutional because there are other 
grounds upon which his conviction can be affirmed. Defendant's 
escape, and thus his incarceration, were integral facts of the 
crime which the jury would hear regardless of a bifurcated guilt 
proceeding. Also, defendant voluntarily offered his own 
extensive criminal record and having invited any error cannot now 
claim that he was prejudiced. Further, there were two other 
aggravating circumstances supporting the first degree murder 
conviction. Finally, there was overwhelming evidence of 
defendant's guilt and introduction of his prior record was 
harmless. 
V. The mitigation evidence offered by defendant was 
irrelevant to defendant's history or the nature of the crime. 
The trial court properly excluded this evidence and the evidence 
about other capital defendants because it did not relate to the 
defendant. While mitigation evidence is generally very broad, a 
-?-
trial court retains its traditional authority to exclude 
irrelevant evidence even though the defendant labels it as 
mitigating. 
VI. & VII. The jury instructions and the verdict forms 
did not create a presumption that death was the appropriate 
penalty nor shift the burden of proof to defendant. The jury was 
informed that the State must prove that aggravation outweighed 
mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt. They were not instructed 
to presume death nor that they must unanimously find mitigation 
before it could be weighed against the aggravation. Thus, Utah's 
capital sentencing procedures are constitutional. 
VIII. This Court appropriately determined that counsel 
was effective on the three issues it treated that were raised in 
defendant's pro se pleadings. The issue of prejudice may be 
determined from the trial record without having first determined 
whether counsel performed deficiently. Thus, an evidentiary 
hearing would provide no further assistance to the Court on the 
issue of prejudice and is not necessary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT NOT TO LIMIT THE JURY'S USE OF WAYNE 
JORGENSEN'S TESTIMONY. 
Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred 
in admitting defendant's prior inconsistent statements in 
rebuttal to his denial of the statements because they were 
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). This Court 
held that admission of the statements was proper to rebut 
defendant's inconsistent testimony regardless of Miranda or 
Massiah violations. The Court further found that it was not 
manifest error for the trial court not to have instructed the 
jury sua sponte to limit its use of the evidence to credibility. 
On petition for rehearing, defendant claims that this Court 
should have found manifest, reversible error in the trial court's 
failure to give a limiting instruction. Defendant's claim fails 
because, if there was error, it was not manifest and it was 
harmless. 
In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 553 (Utah 1987), 
this Court stated that it will review issues in death cases which 
were not preserved in the trial court, but will reverse a 
conviction based upon these errors only if they are manifest and 
prejudicial. Manifest or "plain" error is one that should have 
been obvious to the trial court. State v. Holland, 111 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 8, 12, n.3 (June 22, 1989), referring to State v. Eldredge, 
101 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 18-19 (Feb. 1, 1989). If this Court 
determines that an error was not plain, it need not continue on 
to the prejudice issue. If the error is plain, it "is 
prejudicial only if . . . absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant." State 
v, Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988). This Court's 
confidence in the outcome must be undermined by the error, or no 
prejudice will be found. Ld. Applying these standards to the 
issue at hand, this Court properly found that there was no 
reversible error. 
First, it is not clear that such a limiting instruction 
was required. This Court has not previously ruled that limiting 
instructions are required when prior inconsistent statements are 
offered. Also, there is some criticism of the use of limiting 
instructions which suggests that juries do not understand such a 
subtle distinction in the use of the evidence. See e.g. United 
States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616, 624-25, n. 10, 11 (5th Cir. 1976). 
From the face of the hearsay rule, it appears that no 
limiting instruction is needed. Prior inconsistent statements 
are not hearsay in Utah if the declarant testifies and denies 
having made the statement. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). The 
purpose of a limiting instruction is to prevent the jury from 
using hearsay statements, that may not be reliable, for the truth 
of the matter asserted. If, on the other hand, the statement is 
not hearsay, a limiting instruction would be purposeless. See 3A 
Wigmore, Evidence §1018, 996 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). As the 
United States Supreme Court held in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149 (1970), where the declarant appears at trial, any prior out-
of-court statements are admissible substantively and do not 
violate the right to confrontation. 
In the case of statements obtained in violation of 
Miranda or Massiah, unless there is some indication that the 
statements were involuntary, no purpose would be served by a 
limiting instruction because the statements of a defendant do not 
become unreliable simply because of a technical violation of 
Miranda or Massiah. Cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 312 
(1984); (defendant's voluntary statements taken in violation of 
Miranda admissible in rebuttal to defendant's contrary testimony 
because defendant may not use these prophylactic rules as a 
shield from his own perjury); Harris v. New Yorkf 401 U.S. 222, 
224-26 (1971) (defendant has no license under Miranda to commit 
perjury free from risk of confrontation with his own statements). 
Analogously, a confession, which is an admission of a party 
opponent, is not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) and such a 
statement does not require a limiting instruction. 
This Court need not reach the issue of the substantive 
use of defendant's statements, however, because it has disposed 
of the issue on manifest error analysis. Because there is no 
Utah case law on the subject, and because there is disagreement 
whether a limiting instruction is required, this Court 
appropriately determined that there was no reversible error. 
Also supporting this Court's finding that there was not 
manifest error is the fact that the trial court was not even 
alerted that there was any problem with admission of the 
statements on Miranda or Massiah grounds. Consequently, the 
Court never made any findings upon the issue and this Court 
cannot determine from the state of this record whether there was 
such an error. If there was no error of this sort, the 
statements could clearly have come in substantively as statements 
against interest under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). Unless the trial judge 
was alerted to the possible limited use of defendant's statements 
for impeachment only, it is likely that the judge believed the 
statements came in substantively and, therefore, could not have 
been expected to address the issue sua sponte. 
Defendant also asserts that most jurisdictions that 
have admitted statements obtained in violation of Miranda or 
Massiah have done so in cases where a limiting instruction was 
given. While United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 
1979) did use a limiting instruction, the court did not hold that 
such an instruction was required. Also, the instruction actually 
used in that case did not in fact limit the jury's use of the 
statements. The court quoted with approval the following 
language: 
[the tape is] to be used by you only in 
connection with or as to the question of 
impeachment of the testimony of the 
defendant. In other words, as to whether or 
not his testimony is truthful in view of the 
tape which you heard. You have to decide 
that issue. You have the issue as to what 
you wish to believe and that is part of your 
duty in determining the facts. 
McManaman, 606 F.2d at 924 (emphasis added). This language is 
unclear in that it appears initially to limit the use of the 
statements, but in the highlighted portion, appears to approve 
its substantive use. 
In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), while the 
trial court gave a limiting instruction, the United States 
Supreme Court did not hold that the instruction was necessary. 
Indeed, the Court even noted that both counsel argued the 
substance of the statements and did not find that such 
substantive use was improper. 401 U.S. at 223. 
Defendant also asserts that it was error for the court 
not to have given a limiting instruction to the jury because the 
efftfo
 «Red defendant's statements in closing argument to show 
defendant's intent to kill. Harris disposes of this issue, but 
even if it was error for the prosecutor to use the statements 
substantively, there was other overwhelming evidence of intent 
and it is unlikely that the jury would have found otherwise if 
they were instructed not to use defendant's statements 
substantively. 
Similar to Harris, in Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 
(1975), the trial court gave a limiting instruction. The Supreme 
Court noted that the instruction was given, but did not use this 
fact to support its finding that the statement was properly 
admitted. 420 U.S. at 717. 
Finally, State v. Walker, 138 Ariz. 491, 675 P.2d 1310 
(1984), does state that such a limiting instruction is required. 
Noticeably, however, the Arizona court did not cite to any 
authority for the proposition, nor did it analyze the issue in 
any way. 
Even if this Court determined that there was plain 
error, it correctly declined to reverse defendant's conviction 
because there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt in 
this case and, thus, no prejudice from admission of the evidence. 
More specifically, there was overwhelming evidence that defendant 
intended to kill Michael Burdell. Defendant knew that he would 
find a gun underneath the drinking fountain in the courthouse 
that day. Defendant took the gun that he found there and fired 
at the prison guards several times before he was wounded. 
Because the gun was a single-action revolver, defendant had to 
cock the hammer each time he fired. 
After he was wounded, he went into the clerk's office 
and fired at Burdell who was hiding behind the door, point blank. 
He must have first cocked the gun as he aimed at Burdell because 
the gun will not fire without first being cocked. He then left 
the room, fired at a court bailiff, returned to the clerk's 
office and told another prison employee to "come on, you asshole" 
and show him a way out of the building. Upstairs, he took a 
vending machine delivery man hostage and stated "You are next. 
Walk with me." Defendant then exited the building. 
While defendant may have been acting spontaneously, he 
was not acting like the confused person he claimed to be. All of 
his actions were calculated to obtain what he was seeking—his 
freedom. From his actions and his statements made to victims at 
the scene, there is overwhelming evidence from which the jury 
determined that he intended to kill. Given all of the evidence 
indicating defendant's guilt of first degree intentional murder, 
it was not manifest and prejudicial error for the trial court not 
to have instructed the jury to use defendant's statements only 
for assessing credibility. 
Because there was not manifest and prejudicial error in 
the trial court failing to give a sua sponte limiting 
instruction, defendant is not entitled to rehearing on this 
issue. This Court did not overlook or misapprehend the facts or 
the law in reaching its conclusion that there was not manifest, 
reversible error and it should deny rehearing. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO A MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION, 
AND, THUS, THAT ANY ERROR IN THE GIVEN 
INSTRUCTION WAS HARMLESS. 
At defendant's request, a manslaughter instruction was 
given at trial. Defendant objected to a portion of the 
instruction which stated: 
For Manslaughter to apply, the 'extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance' must be 
triggered by something external from the 
accused, and his reaction to such external 
stimulus must be reasonable, and the terms 
must be given the meaning you would give them 
in common everyday use. Such disturbance 
therefore cannot have been brought about by 
the defendant's own peculiar mental processes 
or by hie intentional knowing or reckless 
acts . 
Instruction 34 (emphasis added). This Court found that the 
instruction, while erroneous in stating that the emotional 
disturbance must be viewed objectively rather than subjectively, 
was correct in stating that the emotional disturbance could not 
be brought upon by one's own criminal acts. Defendant requests 
rehearing claiming that this interpretation precludes juries from 
considering manslaughter in many of the traditional manslaughter 
cases. Defendant's characterization of the Court's opinion is 
mistaken. 
Defendant outlines at length circumstances in which he 
claims that juries would be precluded from considering 
manslaughter where the act of killing is preceded by some type of 
crime which he claims places the hypothetical defendants in 
circumstances like his. Defendant misses the point of this 
Court's decision. It is not merely the fact that the killing was 
preceded by another crime that eliminates the manslaughter 
option. It is the fact that the emotional disturbance which 
defendant claims mitigates the killing to manslaughter was 
produced by the preceding crime that eliminates the manslaughter 
option. 
Defendant's hypothetical situations are not situations 
in which the actor's criminal activity produced the emotional 
disturbance. For instance, the "grief-stricken parent" who kills 
someone with an illegally concealed weapon does not suffer from 
an emotional disturbance as a result of carrying the weapon. 
Rather, this person kills as a result of their reaction to the 
death of their child which they mistakenly believe is the fault 
of the victim. 
Defendant, on the other hand, killed as the result of 
his reaction to the situation in which he intentionally placed 
himself—the escape attempt. He asks this Court to ignore that 
the triggering act for his disturbance reached back beyond the 
point in time when he was wounded to his intentional escape 
attempt and focus upon the wound he received as the triggering 
act. What defendant forgets is that his wound was produced by 
his escape plan. His resulting disturbance, therefore, was 
produced by his criminal acts. 
Defendant is mistaken in his belief that this Court's 
opinion precludes a manslaughter defense where the defendant was 
involved in any separate crime. This Court's opinion does not 
stand for that proposition. Rather, this Court held that this 
defendant's crime produced the disturbance that he claims 
mitigates the first degree murder to manslaughter. It would be 
a ludicrous result if any person who attempted to escape lawful 
custody could claim as mitigation of intentional murder the fact 
that he was upset when his escape plans went awry either because 
of his unfamiliarity with the gun or because he was wounded. 
Defendant's situation is precisely the type that the 
commentators to the Model Penal Code envisioned. It is a 
situation in which, as defendant states, the "offender [was] 
culpably responsible for the disturbance." App. Br. at 13. As 
defendant further states, the commentators do "not state that in 
all cases where a defendant was involved in a crime, manslaughter 
does not apply." Ld. They do state, however, that manslaughter 
does not apply where the defendant has "intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, or negligently brought about his own memtal 
disturbance, such as by involving himself in a crime." Model 
Penal Code §210.3 (official draft & revised comments, 1980, Part 
II, at 64). 
Finally, defendant completely ignores this Court's 
comment that defendant cannot complain of an improper 
manslaughter instruction because he was convicted of first degree 
murder. State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 13 n.2 (Utah 
Jan. 31, 1989). For this reason, defendant's request for 
rehearing to "clarify in its opinion that involvement in another 
crime does not automatically preclude a finding of manslaughter" 
should be denied. 
POINT III 
THE INSTRUCTIONS ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONSIDER 
THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES, BUT EVEN IF THE 
JURY CONSIDERED THE MANSLAUGHTER DEFENSE, IT 
WOULD HAVE REJECTED IT, THUS, DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT PREJUDICED. 
Defendant asserts that this Court erred in finding that 
the jury instructions read as a whole allowed the jury to 
consider the lesser included offenses without first having 
unanimously acquitted defendant of first degree murder. He 
argues that he was prejudiced by the instructions because, under 
the extreme emotional disturbance theory of manslaughter, the 
jury could find that he committed an intentional or knowing 
murder but still find him guilty of manslaughter. If, according 
to defendant, the jury understood the instructions to require 
them not to consider the lesser included manslaughter 
alternative, they would stop after convicting him of first degree 
murder and never consider whether he suffered from a disturbance 
that mitigated the crime to manslaughter. 
Defendant is correct in his assertion that the extreme 
emotional disturbance theory of manslaughter mitigates an 
intentional or knowing murder. Consequently, in a case where a 
defendant has raised a legitimate extreme emotional disturbance 
defense, a jury should probably be directed to consider the 
existence of such a disturbance after a finding of intentional or 
knowing murder. However, this Court need not reach this issue in 
this case because defendant did not raise a legitimate 
manslaughter defense. 
Defendant's only theory of manslaughter was that he was 
upset and confused by the events that occurred as a result of his 
escape attempt. As argued in Point II, above, his so-called 
"disturbance" was produced by his own intentional, knowing or 
reckless criminal acts. For this reason, defendant was not even 
entitled to a manslaughter instruction and any error in the trial 
court directing the jury not to consider manslaughter until after 
it acquitted defendant of first degree murder would have been 
harmless if it occurred. 
Furthermore, even if the jury had reached the issue of 
manslaughter, it would have had no choice but to eliminate it as 
an alternative because defendant's criminal acts could not be the 
basis for his claim that he suffered from an extreme emotional 
disturbance. Because the trial court's instruction was correct 
in limiting application of extreme emotional disturbance 
mitigation to circumstances where defendant was not culpably 
responsible for his disturbance, there was no error even if the 
court restricted the jury from considering the inapplicable 
mitigation defense. 
POINT IV 
THIS COURT NEED NOT RULE ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRIOR VIOLENT FELONY 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE BUT MAY AFFIRM 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION ON OTHER GROUNDS. 
Defendant complains that this Court did not find the 
introduction of prior convictions as an aggravating circumstance 
in the guilt phase of a capital trial to be a violation of due 
process. He requests this Court to rehear the issue and find 
such a violation or to give him the retroactive benefit of State 
v. James, 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 18-19 (Utah Jan. 6, 1989). This 
Court need not, however, address the constitutional or James 
issues because, even if it was constitutional error to introduce 
defendant's two robbery convictions as proof of aggravation at 
the guilt phase, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
As noted in the opinion in this case, introduction of 
defendant's two robbery convictions was not prejudicial for 
several reasons. First, defendant's escape from custody was 
evident from the facts presented to the jury about the crimes for 
which he was on trial. It would have been evident even if the 
State had not charged or attempted to prove escape as an 
aggravating circumstance. Further, contrary to defendant's 
assertion, the jury could not have been made aware that defendant 
was escaping from lawful custody without their inferring that 
defendant was at least charged with a prior crime. The fact that 
the State offered only the two robbery convictions, may actually 
have reduced the danger that the jury would speculate on the 
nature of the convictions or charges that caused his 
incarceration. 
Second, defendant took the stand during the guilt phase 
and introduced the remainder of his extensive record voluntarily. 
Any restriction on the State's evidence would have been undone by 
defendant's own testimony. Granted, in the context defendant 
offered the convictions, in a case where prior convictions were 
not elements of the crime; the jury could properly have been 
instructed to limit their use of the convictions to credibility, 
but defendant was not in such a position. 
Third, there were two other aggravating circumstances 
supporting the first degree murder conviction. The fact that the 
jury found these other circumstances undermines defendant's claim 
that he should receive a new trial because the prior conviction 
aggravating circumstance is unconstitutional. Even if this Court 
did strike this circumstance for the initial guilt phase 
determination on constitutional grounds, defendant cannot evade 
the other two aggravating circumstances and any error in the 
introduction of the two robberies would be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Defendant complains that the prosecutor argued all of 
his convictions on the issue of his intent to commit murder. 
This, defendant claims, is impermissible under Utah R. Evid. 
404(b) (1989) because it was used "to prove [his] character . . . 
to show that he acted in conformity therewith." Id. What 
defendant overlooks is that Rule 404(b) also states that evidence 
of other crimes is admissible as "proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident." If the prosecutor was doing as defendant 
suggests, i.e. using his prior convictions on the issue of 
intent, the prosecutor was following Rule 404(b), not violating 
it. Defendant's claim in this regard is, consequently, 
meritless. 
Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor improperly 
used defendant's extensive felony record to impeach his 
credibility in closing argument. Defendant requests this Court 
to ignore that he offered the very convictions that the 
prosecutor referred to and to find that there was plain error in 
the introduction of these convictions. Therefore, defendant 
asserts that this Court cannot rely on his introduction of the 
evidence to support the harmless error analysis. Defendant 
overlooks that invited error is not tolerated even in a capital 
case. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561 (Utah 1987). Defense 
counsel was apparently under the impression, as were many in Utah 
prior to State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), that all 
prior felony convictions were admissible to impeach the 
credibility of the defendant. Be that as it may, defendant 
testified to these convictions without moving to suppress them. 
He, thus, invited any error in their introduction and has waived 
any claim that they were inadmissible. Given that the 
convictions were in evidence, defendant was not prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's use of them for impeachment of defendant's 
credibility. 
Finally, as the Court acknowledged, there is 
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt in this case. There 
is also overwhelming direct evidence of defendant's intent which 
is outlined in Point I, above. Defendant argues that the most 
persuasive evidence of intent was Wayne Jorgensen's recitation of 
defendant's comments in the hospital. The State disagrees and 
asserts that the most persuasive evidence of defendant's intent 
was that he had to cock the gun each time he fired it, that he 
did so even though he claims that he was unfamiliar with the gun 
and surprised that it did not fire initially, that he ordered a 
bystanding prison employee to show him a way out of the building 
after shooting both Burdell and Kirk, and that he told a vending 
machine delivery man that he was "next." These facts create a 
clear picture of intent regardless of defendant's assertion to 
the contrary. 
POINT V 
THIS COURT PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OFFERED BY 
DEFENDANT AS MITIGATION BECAUSE IT WAS 
IRRELEVANT. 
Defendant offered in mitigation testimony of associates 
and family members of Michael Burdell that Burdell would not have 
wanted defendant to receive the death penalty. He also offered 
affidavits from defense attorneys and prosecutors in other 
capital cases summarizing the facts and mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances. The trial court refused to admit this 
evidence and this Court affirmed stating that the evidence was 
irrelevant to the character of defendant and the nature of his 
crime. In his petition for rehearing, defendant again insists 
that this evidence was relevant and should have been admitted 
because the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant 
is entitled to present "unlimited mitigation." App. Br. at 31. 
Defendant is wrong in his assertion that mitigation is completely 
unlimited and, therefore, this Court correctly affirmed the 
exclusion of the evidence defendant offered. 
In Penry v. Lynaugh# U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 2934 
(1989), the United States Supreme Court revisited the limitation 
of mitigating factors in capital cases. The Court reiterated the 
principle that "punishment should be directly related to the 
personal culpability of the criminal defendant." 109 S. Ct. at 
2947. The Court in no way retreated from its statement in 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1986), that the traditional 
authority of a trial court "to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence 
not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the 
circumstances of the offense" is not limited by this principle. 
Defendant's renewed argument on this issue is merely a repetition 
of his initial argument insisting that the evidence was relevant. 
On its face, nevertheless, the evidence defendant 
offered was not directly related to his personal culpability. 
Evidence that defendant happened to choose as his victim a 
bystander who did not believe in the death penalty is not 
relevant to his culpability and its consideration would not 
"reflect a reasoned moral response to [his] background, 
character, and crime." Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2934 (citation 
omitted, emphasis deleted). Rather, the evidence did represent 
an attempt by the defendant to have the jury consider the 
question that is more appropriately left to the Legislature: 
whether the death penalty is appropriate in any case. The trial 
judge correctly excluded this evidence and this Court correctly 
affirmed. 
Defendant points out that the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in South Carolina v. Gathers, U.S. 
, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989). Since defendant filed his petition 
for rehearing, Gathers was decided. In Gathers, the Court again 
stated that a -defendant's punishment must be tailored to his 
personal responsibility and moral guilt." Ijd. at 2210 (citation 
omitted). The Court went on, nonetheless, to uphold the judgment 
of the South Carolina Supreme Court reversing Gathers' death 
sentence on the ground that evidence that the victim was a 
religious man was "unnecessary to an understanding of the 
circumstances of the crime." Id. The South Carolina court went 
on to say that the prosecutor's references to the victim 
"conveyed the suggestion appellant deserved a death sentence 
because the victim was a religious man and a registered voter." 
Id. (citation omitted). 
Thus, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that 
information about the victim that does not relate directly to the 
circumstances of the crime is inadmissible. The Court noted that 
there was no evidence that Gathers had read the prayer card 
carried by the victim and, therefore, the contents of the card 
were irrelevant to the circumstances of the crime. Similarly, 
defendant did not know that Burdell opposed the death penalty 
when he shot him and the fact was, therefore, irrelevant to the 
circumstances of the crime. 
The affidavits defendant offered were also unrelated to 
his background or crime. Comparing other defendants with this 
defendant as this Court stated "would shed no further light on 
defendant's crime, but would instead encourage the jury to 
consider information extraneous to defendant's character and the 
circumstances of his offense." State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3, 11 (Jan. 31, 1989)(emphasis added). 
Regardless of defendant's repeated assertions, the 
evidence was simply irrelevant on the issue for which he offered 
it. The trial court was, therefore, not required to admit it and 
this Court properly affirmed its exclusion. 
POINT VI 
THE PENALTY PHASE INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT 
FORMS DID NOT CREATE A PRESUMPTION THAT DEATH 
WAS THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY. 
For the first time, defendant asserts that the penalty 
phase instructions and verdict forms impermissibly created a 
presumption that death was the appropriate penalty. He urges 
this Court to find that there was manifest and prejudicial error 
requiring rehearing and reversal even though the issue was not 
previously raised or noted by this Court. This issue does not 
merit rehearing or reversal, however, because there was no error. 
In Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469 (11th Cir. 1988), 
cert, denied, 105 S. Ct. 2005 (1988), the court reversed a death 
sentence because the jury received the following instruction: 
When one or more of the aggravating 
circumstances is found, death is presumed to 
be the proper sentence unless it or they are 
overridden by one or more of the mitigating 
circumstances provided. 
Id. at 1473. The Eleventh Circuit found that this instruction 
was inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's direction 
that capital sentencing must be an individualized determination 
allowing for consideration of mitigating factors relevant to the 
particular offender or the offense. 
The instructions defendant points to in his case are 
not like the instruction in Jackson. None of the instructions 
quoted by defendant express any presumption to the jury^ In 
fact, they are stated in either-or terms. They do not tell the 
jury that they must impose death unless defendant provides 
mitigation that overrides the aggravation. In fact, defendant 
ignores that the jury was instructed that the State must 
establish that the aggravation outweighs the mitigation beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Thus, the jury could not have presumed that 
death was the appropriate penalty. The jury could have decided 
not to impose death even if the mitigation was merely equal in 
weight to the aggravation because in that instance, the State 
would not have carried its burden. 
Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988), 
cert, pet, filed, March, 1989, is also distinguishable. The 
Arizona scheme was found unconstitutional there because the 
defendant was required to establish the existence of mitigation 
by a preponderance before it would be weighed against 
aggravation. See 865 F.2d at 1041. Under Utah's scheme, there 
is no burden of proof that defendant must meet in order for the 
weighing process to occur. Any juror may hold out against the 
death penalty even though other jurors do not find that 
mitigation exists, because that juror can fail to find that the 
aggravation outweighs the mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, 
or, because he can fail to find that death is appropriate beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Death is not the presumed penalty in Utah 
because jurors are free to refrain from imposing death if for any 
reason they believe the State has not established its 
appropriateness beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Holland, 111 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 14 (June 22, 1989). 
In his zeal to establish that he was prejudiced, 
defendant exclaims? "[n]otably absent from the . . . 
instructions and . . . possible verdicts is a verdict option . . 
. permitting the jurors to consider and possibly return a verdict 
of unanimity on a finding of a life sentence." App. Br. at 45. 
Defendant undoubtedly does not actually intend to propose that 
the jury be required to unanimously find that life is the 
appropriate penalty. It is true that life is automatically 
imposed by the court where the jury does not find that death is 
appropriate. This, however, benefits defendants, rather than 
prejudicing them. Does defendant wish to create a situation 
where a jury that cannot unanimously find death or life is "hung" 
and a new penalty hearing is required? Undoubtedly, he does not. 
The problem with defendant's assertion is that, if the 
jury were required to return a unanimous verdict of life, Utah's 
scheme would most likely violate the very doctrine he urges in 
support of the proposition. Mills v. Maryland, U.S. , 
, 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988) struck down a scheme which required a 
jury to unanimously find at least one mitigating factor or the 
sentence would necessarily be death. Defendant's proposition 
comes perilously close to this scheme. 
Interestingly, Mills noted that the Maryland Supreme 
Court in upholding Mills' sentence reached a "saving" 
interpretation of Maryland's capital sentencing scheme. 108 S. 
Ct. at 1863, 1867. The United States Supreme Court reversed, 
however, because it was not sure that the jury interpreted the 
instructions in the same "saving" manner and found that a 
reasonable juror could have employed an impermissible 
interpretation. Nevertheless, that "saving" interpretation is 
instructive here because it is quite similar in effect to Utah's 
scheme. Under the Maryland Supreme Court's view Has long as one 
juror believes that there exists a mitigating factor, and that 
this factor is not outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, 
and if such juror continues to adhere to his or h€*r position, the 
sentence will not be death under the statutory scheme." 108 S. 
Ct. at 1864 (citation omitted). 
Defendant asserts that the alleged defect in Utah's 
scheme is "even more egregious" than the defect in Mills. The 
State disagrees that there is any defect in Utah's scheme which 
allows one hold out juror to cause a life sentence to be imposed. 
Defendant's contention is not born by review of Utah's capital 
sentencing scheme and it should be rejected. 
POINT VII 
THE UTAH DEATH PENALTY SCHEME DOES NOT SHIFT 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT AT THE 
SENTENCING PHASE. 
Defendant asserts that this Court erroneously relied on 
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S.. 231, 108 S. Ct. 546 (1988), to 
find that the Utah death penalty scheme is constitutional. He 
argues that Lowenfield did not decide the issue he raised. The 
issue was: Whether the defendant bears the burden of proof at 
penalty phase to establish mitigation to overcome a presumptive 
penalty of death which results from the jury having already found 
the aggravating factors to exist beyond a reasonable doubt at 
guilt phase. Defendant's assertion that this Court erred is 
incorrect and does not merit rehearing. 
In Lowenfield, the Supreme Court rejected the claim 
that use at the penalty phase of the sole aggravating 
circumstance proven at guilt phase left the jury 'free merely to 
repeat one of its findings in the guilt phase, and thus not to 
narrow further in the sentencing phase the class of death-
eligible murderers." 108 S. Ct. at 553. This issue, stated in 
other terms, is the same issue advanced by defendant in this 
case. Defendant complains that there is a presumption of death 
unless he can overcome it. Lowenfield also asserted that the 
jury would presume that death was appropriate simply because the 
aggravating circumstance had already been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Even if Lowenfield does not answer the question, this 
Court has already rejected similar arguments in other death 
cases. Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812 (Utah 1980), cert, denied, 
449 U.S. 891 (1980) held: 
Contrary to Pierre's contention, the burden 
of proof is not shifted . . . The defendant 
is simply afforded the opportunity of 
presenting any evidence he may have in 
mitigation. The most that can be said . . . 
is that the defendant then has the "burden" 
of going forward, but only if he so desires. 
The burden of proof remains at all times on 
the prosecution. 
607 P.2d at 815. Pierre was recently reaffirmed in State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 460 n.65 (Utah 1988). 
What defendant fails to see is that just because the 
State has proved that one or more aggravating circumstances exist 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not necessarily mean that those 
factors will weigh more heavily on a juror's mind than other 
factors in the weighing process. The State must still prove that 
the aggravation outweighs the mitigation beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 988 (1982). The jurors could conceivably find mitigation in 
the evidence presented at the guilt phase sufficient to prevent a 
finding that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable 
doubt even if a defendant presents nothing new at the penalty 
phase. Thus, defendant's claim is groundless. 
What defendant requests, in essence, is that Utah adopt 
a capital punishment scheme that is less restrictive at the guilt 
phase than it is now. Defendant complains that the aggravation 
must be proven at the guilt phase, consequently, narrowing the 
pool of persons who are eligible for the death penalty before the 
penalty phase is even reached. Defendant's argument is short-
sighted in that he would have more persons proceed to a penalty 
phase than do under the existing scheme. Because Lowenfield 
states that narrowing may be done at the guilt phase, defendant's 
suggestion need not be adopted. 
Defendant asserts that Utah's scheme is 
indistinguishable from the Arizona scheme struck down in Adamson 
v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988). Utah's statute and 
the jury instructions in this case are distinguishable from 
Arizona's. In Adamson, the court found constitutional defects in 
Arizona's statute because once a single aggravating circumstance 
was found, the jury was required to find the existence of 
mitigation by a preponderance before it could be weighed against 
the aggravation and was further required by statute to find that 
mitigation was "sufficiently substantial to call for leniency." 
865 F.2d at 1041, quoting A.R.S. S13-703(E). 
In contrast, Utah requires the State to prove that 
aggravation exists and that it outweighs mitigation and that 
death is the appropriate sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 84 (Utah), cert, denied 459 U.S. 988 
(1982). The defendant is not required to prove anything, but may 
present any relevant mitigation. "Thus, the sentencing authority 
may refuse to impose the death penalty even though it concedes 
that the aggravating circumstances 'outweigh' the mitigating 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Holland, 111 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 14 (June 22, 1989). Utah's scheme, therefore, 
allows for full consideration of relevant mitigation, does not 
presume that death is the appropriate penalty and does not shift 
the burden of proof to defendant. Utah's capital sentencing 
scheme is, therefore, constitutional. 
POINT VIII 
THIS COURT TIMELY DECIDED DEFENDANT'S 
INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL CLAIM. 
Defendant complains that this Court prematurely decided 
his ineffective assistance of counsel claims presented in pro se 
documents. He asserts that an evidentiary hearing was necessary 
to establish his claims. The simple answer to defendant's 
complaint is that this Court could adequately review the grounds 
that it reviewed from the record established at trial and an 
evidentiary hearing was not necessary. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient 
in some demonstrable way and that the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. State v. Carter, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 15 
(May 12, 1989). Prejudice is shown if the court determines that 
if it were not for the performance of counsel, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. .Id. The court may proceed 
directly to the prejudice prong of this test without first 
considering whether counsel performed deficiently. Id. 
Defendant complained on appeal that counsel was 
ineffective by failing to object to the testimony of Wayne 
Jorgensen, Dr. Peter Heinbecker and Dennis Fuchs. This Court 
found that whether or not it was deficient performance for 
counsel not to have objected, defendant was not prejudiced by 
counsel's performance. Defendant complains in his petition for 
rehearing that he could have established prejudice if given an 
opportunity to present evidence. Defendant confuses the 
"prejudice" prong of the test with the "deficient performance" 
prong. Because the Court need not determine that counsel 
performed deficiently to determine that there was no prejudice, 
no hearing is needed. 
Defendant says that he needs to establish a record 
about Jorgensen's testimony because defense counsel was unaware 
of a possible grounds for suppression of the evidence and did 
not, therefore, make a record on the issue. What defendant 
overlooks is that, even if he could show that counsel should have 
objected to admission of the evidence in the State's case in 
chief, making that record will not establish prejudice. This 
Court determined from the record before it, that even if the 
evidence had been suppressed in the State's case in chief, it 
would still come in for the purpose it was offered and defendant 
was, therefore, not prejudiced by counsel's failure to object. 
Defendant further argues that he may not have testified 
if counsel had told him that the State could impeach him with his 
prior statements. He complains that counsel did not understand 
that the evidence, though possibly suppressible, could be used 
for impeachment. If counsel had understood this point, defendant 
alleges, he could have more adequately advised defendant whether 
to testify. The point defendant misses here is that if counsel 
believed the evidence came in substantively as defendant claims 
he did, counsel already knew defendant could be questioned about 
it even if defendant did not deny making the statements. Thus, a 
hearing to establish that counsel thought the evidence came in 
substantively would not enlighten the court on the issue of 
prejudice. 
Next, defendant claims that he needs to present 
evidence on whether he was prejudiced by Dr. Heinbecker's or 
Dennis Fuch's testimony. However, this Court has already 
determined that even if counsel had objected to Heinbecker's and 
Fuch's testimony, the result of the proceeding would not have 
been different. 
Usually, an evidentiary hearing is not used to 
establish that the result of the proceeding would have been 
different if counsel had done what he allegedly failed to do. 
Instead, it is used to establish that counsel failed to do 
something or did something potentially prejudicial that is not 
evident in the record. Here, defendant's claims could be 
adequately reviewed because what defendant says is that he would 
rather Heinbecker and Fuchs had not said some of the things they 
said. A hearing to establish that counsel would not have used 
these two witnesses if he knew what they were going to say does 
not establish prejudice, although, it perhaps establishes 
deficient performance. This Court, however, can and did 
determine from the record that defendant was not prejudiced by 
the evidence even if counsel was deficient in presenting it. 
Because there is no reasonable likelihood of a 
different result even if counsel had objected to the testimony of 
these three witnesses, and because there is an adequate record 
from which this Court could determine this issue, no rehearing is 
necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to deny defendant's request for a rehearing. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 7/h day of September, 
1989. 
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